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Forum on Public Policy

Is the U.S. Government's Mining of Commercial Data Contributing to an
Erosion of Trust in Government?
Carter Manny, Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Southern Maine
Abstract
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. Government turned to data
mining practices for the avowed purpose of protecting public security. Relying on a combination of legislative
authorization and cooperation by the private sector, federal institutions have obtained access to information in
commercial databases collected largely from routine business transactions by ordinary people posing no particular
threat to public order. Much of the data mining has occurred without safeguards like prior court authorization and
limitations in the Privacy Act of 1974. In the absence of these safeguards designed to protect individual liberty, data
mining appears to have contributed to an erosion of public trust in government. Government surveillance following
September 11, like responses to other crises in U.S. history, is motivated by fear. While many members of Congress
have supported greater restraints on data mining, their efforts tend to be overridden by fear-based justifications for
surveillance.

I. Introduction
Several days after the September 11, 2001, attack on the U.S., Hank Asher, founder of a
Florida-based commercial data broker company known as Seisint, ran a new data mining system
through the company's 20-billion-record database. He came up with a list of names of 120,000
people the system had identified as having a "high terrorist factor." Those names were then
reduced to a "1 percent list" of 1,200 people deemed to be the biggest threats. The names of five
of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were on the list. When Asher demonstrated Seisint's
system to officials from the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, they were greatly
impressed. 1
While this after-the-attack search of a commercial database raised some exciting
possibilities in the minds of those interested in protecting public security, it also raised questions
about the potential threat to civil liberties posed by government access to the billions of items of
personal information held in commercial databases.

Although some of the information, like

names, street addresses, phone numbers, voter registration records, court records, marital
records, and real estate records have been publicly available on paper for decades, recent
1

See Jeffrey W. Seifert, Data Mining and Homeland Security, An Overview, available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf (last visited July 19, 2007); ROBERT O'HARROW JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 98-102 (2005).
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advances in computer technology have made it economically feasible for data brokers to compile
electronic dossiers on most of the people in the U.S. Moreover, through information collected
through a host of consumer transactions, it is possible to combine a wide variety of non-public
data with public records to provide a detailed account of someone's life. Non-public personal
information can include e-mail addresses, financial information, travel history, employment
history, subscriptions to publications and membership in organizations. The data can be linked
with information about other people in the household. Although the credit reporting industry,
dominated by Equifax, Experion and Trans Union, has been subject to privacy and other
restrictions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act since 1970, the data broker industry, currently
dominated by ChoicePoint, Acxiom and LexisNexis, is subject to far less regulation.
These developments raise some important questions about government's response to the
threat of terrorism. What about the 1,195 people on Hank Asher's "1 percent list," branded as
possessing a "high terrorist factor," who were not part of the September 11 attacks? Were they
unfairly identified? Is a data mining system based on some of the known characteristics of the
hijackers, including ethnicity, pilot training, age and gender, along with other factors including
social security number anomalies, credit history and connection with "dirty" addresses and phone
numbers, likely to be effective at identifying potential future terrorists? Do security concerns
justify this type of data mining? Are civil liberties being threatened? Do the answers to these
questions indicate that data mining is contributing to an erosion of trust in government?
Ii. Privacy, Ethics and Society
Privacy is a complex concept with many different definitions. It is characterized as a
human right in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has been

3
enshrined as a fundamental right in European law. 2 It is connected with liberty and personal
autonomy. Alan Westin, in his influential 1967 book, Privacy and Freedom, explains how
privacy arises out of nature. 3 Privacy has also been analyzed from a harm-based approach. 4 For
example, publication of an embarrassing photograph can injure one's sense of dignity, even when
no economic or psychological harm can be demonstrated. Lack of privacy also can affect
behavior. People understandably will feel more inhibited when they know they are being
observed. While this can be beneficial in promoting order in a crowded public place, the
uninvited scrutiny of others can put a damper on creative activities like art, musical composition,
and scientific inquiry. Lack of privacy can reduce security. The availability of someone's street
address can increase the likelihood that the person will be targeted by a stalker, kidnapper or
thief.
Privacy can also be viewed from the perspective of moral principles of justice. For
example, restrictions on the dissemination of certain types of personal information, like religion
or economic background, can help promote equality by reducing the likelihood that a prospective
employer will use these criteria to reject the person's employment application. In other words,
privacy can help promote equal treatment. Privacy can also help promote fairness in economic
exchanges. For example, if a potential buyer of a house knows that the seller needs money
quickly to pay for a kidney transplant for a sick child, the buyer might have an unfair advantage
in negotiating a low purchase price. Similarly, if a seller knows that a buyer is wealthy, the
seller may be less likely to be flexible in agreeing to a reduction of the asking price.

2
See United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art. 12, reprinted in THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2003,
318, (Marc Rotenberg, ed.); Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Nov. 4, 1950), art. 8, reprinted in THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2003, 325, (Marc Rotenberg, ed.)
3
See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-11 (1967)(documenting the need that animals have for seclusion.)
4
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
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Societal changes also profoundly affect notions of privacy.

Prior to the twentieth

century, much of the information about an American's private life could be discovered through
physical objects, including documents, located in one's home.

With industrialization,

urbanization, electronic communications and finally computer technology, most of those details
now are located in records held by businesses and other large institutions. Financial institutions,
communications companies, credit reporting bureaus, commercial data brokers, government
agencies, health care providers and educational institutions now possess massive amounts of
electronic information about the lives of most Americans. The shift of personal information
from the home to large, third party custodians has made it easier for government to get access to
personal data.
Iii. Legal Devices For Government Access To Information
A. Search Warrants
One of the grievances that led to the war of independence was the British government's
use of general warrants authorizing indiscriminate searches of the American colonists' homes. In
order to prevent such abuses, the Founding Fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment to guarantee
that searches be based on particularized suspicion satisfying the standard of "probably cause"
rather than on general authorization. 5

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against

"unreasonable searches and seizures," has generally been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court
to require the government official to obtain a search warrant from a judge prior to the search. In
a criminal investigation, the police must present the judge with enough information to establish
"probable cause." For civil investigations by administrative agencies, the information presented
to the judge is subject to a much lower standard. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted
5
The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

5
the Fourth Amendment to allow criminal and administrative searches without a search warrant
under certain exceptions.

For example, some types of warrantless criminal searches are

permitted when evidence is in plain view 6 or when motorists are stopped at a properly
administered sobriety checkpoint. 7 Warrantless administrative searches have been permitted for
certain "closely regulated industries" like pharmacies, gun dealers and businesses which sell
alcoholic beverages, as long as the inspection is done pursuant to a properly administered
inspection program. 8 Today, for reasons explained below in the material on subpoenas, search
warrants tend to be used primarily to search for physical evidence in homes and businesses. 9
B. Electronic Surveillance
With the development of the telephone and radio, investigative methods expanded to
include the ability to intercept phone calls through wiretaps and other conversations using
wireless transmitters, commonly called "bugs." In 1928 the Supreme Court held that a wiretap
did not require a search warrant because there was no physical trespass. 10 Almost 40 years later,
in a pair of Fourth Amendment cases decided in 1967, the Supreme Court reversed itself and
eliminated the physical trespass analysis with respect to electronic eavesdropping. One decision
struck down a state law authorizing court approved police electronic eavesdropping on the
ground that the law did not require the police officer to establish probable cause as required by
the Fourth Amendment in order to get court approval. 11

In the other, the Supreme Court

invalidated police use without a court order of an electronic listening device on the exterior of a
pubic telephone booth. 12 The following year Congress passed comprehensive crime control

6

See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
8
See, e.g., New York v. Berger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
9
See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 810 (2005).
10
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11
See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
12
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7
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legislation with provisions regarding warrants for electronic surveillance. 13 Despite Supreme
Court decisions and statutory responses, Fourth Amendment requirements with respect to
electronic surveillance remain open to some interpretation. 14
One controversial area that remains unsettled is whether electronic surveillance in the
U.S. without prior court authorization is permissible with respect to national security. Because
of abusive electronic surveillance of domestic groups during the Vietnam War uncovered by a
committee chaired by Senator Frank Church, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. 15 Prior to engaging in domestic electronic surveillance when
investigating foreign intelligence operations, the federal government is supposed to obtain
authorization from a special court created by FISA. The proceedings of the FISA court are
secret. Despite the existence of the FISA statute and court, the Bush administration secretly
authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in surveillance of electronic
communications in the U.S. without prior court approval. After the NSA surveillance program
was reported by the press in late 2005, lawsuits were filed challenging both the program and the
participation of phone companies in providing information. 16

In January 2007 the Bush

Administration announced that it would obtain authorization from the FISA court for electronic
eavesdropping under the one NSA program whose existence had become public knowledge, 17

13

See generally Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20.
See, e.g., Curtis Bradley, et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650 (last visited Aug. 14, 2007)(letter by legal scholars noting that the U.S. Supreme Court
in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), "left open the question of the Fourth Amendment validity
of warrantless wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes.")
15
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2000).
16
In ACLU v. NSA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in July, 2007, that the journalist and attorney plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the NSA's warrantless interception of communications because they could not show that they were
actually subject to surveillance. See Sixth Circuit Rejects NSA Spying Challenge; Finds Journalists, Attorneys Lack Standing, 6
PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (BNA) 1081 (2007). Another set of cases consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California involve lawsuits by the U.S. Justice Department to block over 20 states from investigating cooperation by
telecommunication companies with alleged NSA surveillance activities. See, e.g., Multidistrict Panel Consolidates More Suits In
Web of Claims Related to NSA Surveillance, 6 PRIVACY & SECURITY L. REP. (BNA) 324 (2007).
17
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau and David Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007 at
A1.
14
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but there has been speculation that other secret electronic surveillance programs were also being
run. 18

The following August, however, Congress passed temporary legislation allowing

surveillance of telephone and internet communications without prior court authorization. 19
C. Subpoenas
Prior court approval is not the only legal process for obtaining personal information in an
investigation. In many instances, the production of documentary evidence is compelled by
means of a subpoena. A subpoena can be issued by a court or other governmental institution
ordering the recipient either to testify at a hearing, or to produce evidence. Unlike a search
warrant which cannot be contested prior to the search, the recipient of a subpoena has the legal
right to contest its validity in court before complying with the order to testify or produce
evidence.

In criminal cases, subpoenas are often used in connection with a grand jury

investigation. Although a subpoena is a court document, as a practical matter it is filled out by
the prosecutor who has some discretion to determine when it should be used. After the subpoena
has been delivered, the recipient decides whether to comply with the subpoena or challenge it in
court. A successful challenge will cause a court to modify or quash the subpoena. Someone
who refuses to comply with a valid subpoena can be punished for contempt of court. 20
Another type of subpoena, an administrative subpoena, is available in many types of
investigations by federal agencies. There are over 300 statutory provisions through which
Congress has authorized federal administrative agencies to issue subpoenas. 21 As with grand
jury subpoenas, administrative subpoenas can be challenged in court before the evidence is
18

See comments by Peter Swire on the Public Broadcasting System television program Frontline titled "Spying on the Home
Front" broadcast on May 15, 2007.
19
See The Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55 (2007) (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for a period
of 120 days beginning on August 5, 2007.)
20
See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
21
See, e.g., Testimony of Rachel Brand, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, before the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee, June 24, 2004, available at http://usdoj.gov/ olp/pdf/dojaag_brand_062204.pdf (last visited July 27,
2007).
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produced. In order to have a court quash or modify a subpoena, the challenger must prove one or
more of the following: (1) that compliance would cause an undue burden, (2) that the evidence is
not relevant to an authorized investigation, or (3) that the evidence is protected by a legal
privilege, for example the attorney-client privilege. 22
Today, many administrative subpoenas are not a "first party" subpoena in which the
target of the investigation is the recipient, but a "third party" subpoena in which the recipient is
the custodian of information about a target. For example, a bank, phone company or Internet
service provider might be the recipient of a third party subpoena seeking information about a
customer. It is unlikely that anyone will go to court to quash or modify a third party subpoena.
The target of the investigation will probably not know about the subpoena unless informed by
the third party business. Even if there is some sort of notice, a challenge in court would be too
late if the information has already been provided to the investigator. The third party business
probably has little incentive to challenge the subpoena in court, unless the volume of information
requested would be expensive to produce, thus meeting the "undue burden" legal standard. For
economic reasons, it is unlikely that the third party would bear the expense of challenging a
subpoena on the grounds that the information about a customer is not relevant to an
investigation.
Even if a target customer learns about a subpoena, he will have difficulty challenging it
on Constitutional grounds. The U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to provide the customer
with little protection against third party subpoenas. The Supreme Court has held that there is no
Fourth Amendment search protection in information which someone has provided to a third
party 23 and that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination does not apply to

22
23

See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 806 (2005).
See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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business records. 24 The target customer could try to challenge the subpoena on the grounds that
the evidence sought is irrelevant to an investigation, although this argument is unlikely to
succeed in many types of investigations.

A challenge based upon the contention that the

information is protected by a legal privilege is even less likely to succeed, because there are no
legal privileges in most commercial relationships.
The Constitution, and general provisions regarding subpoena power, provide few
safeguards against government use of subpoenas to obtain documentary personal information
from third party businesses like banks, phone companies and Internet service providers.
Accordingly, investigators often use subpoenas to compel production of personal information in
business databases. Of course, there would be no reason to use a subpoena if the business
volunteers to provide information. 25
D. National Security Letters
A National Security Letter (NSL) is a more powerful version of an administrative
subpoena. There are several statutory provisions which authorize the FBI to issue an NSL to
order production of documentary evidence held by communications providers, financial
institutions, credit reporting bureaus and other organizations. Although most of the provisions
existed prior to 2001, governmental authority to issue National Security Letters was greatly
strengthened by the Patriot Act passed a few weeks after September 11. Authority to issue NSLs
was expanded to include FBI field offices as well as FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.

24

See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Newspaper articles published in June 2006 revealed that since shortly after September 11, 2001, the U.S. Treasury Department
had been mining electronic financial data transmitted over a communications system operated by the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Transfers (SWIFT.) The newspaper articles contain information that in the immediate aftermath of
September 11, SWIFT initially was very cooperative in providing data when it was approached by the U.S. Treasury, but after a
period of months SWIFT had second thoughts, which may have caused the Treasury to use subpoenas to compel production of
the information. Moreover, SWIFT's discomfort with government access to the data caused it to negotiate with the Treasury to
add safeguards for protection of the data. See Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006 at A1; Josh Meyer and Greg Miller, U.S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, June 23, 2006 at A1.
25
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Investigations to guard against international terrorism were added to counterintelligence as
permissible purposes. Prior to the Patriot Act, the FBI could only issue an NSL when it had
specific facts that the target of the investigation was a foreign power or its agent. The Patriot Act
replaced the "specific facts" and "foreign power" limitations with a much lower standard
allowing the National Security Letter to order production of evidence that is relevant to the
investigation.

The lowering of the standard to mere "relevance" arguably gives the FBI

Congressional authority to order a business to make an entire commercial database available to
government investigators, as long as there is some reason to believe it might contain information
connected in some way with terrorist activity. Moreover, the National Security Letter statutes
contain nondisclosure, or "gag," provisions, prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing
its existence to anyone at any time. The gag provisions made it very difficult to challenge the
validity of a National Security Letter in Court. 26
However, two challenges to NSLs were brought by the American Civil Liberties Union in
federal trial courts in New York and Connecticut. The court in the New York case held that
National Security Letters violated the Fourth Amendment because they compelled searches
which were effectively immune from any judicial process, and First Amendment protection for
freedom of speech because the gag provision was so absolute that it lacked a process for it to be
lifted by the FBI or a court. 27 The court in the Connecticut case also ruled that NSLs were
invalid, but limited its reasoning to the same First Amendment rationale used by the federal court
in New York. 28

26

See Charles Doyle, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse of the Legal Background and
Recent Amendments, available at http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/intel/ RS22406.pdf (last visited July 25, 2007).
27
See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
28
See Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F.Supp.2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
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Congress, however, addressed the Constitutional defects identified in the two cases when
it reauthorized provisions in the Patriot Act in 2006. 29

The 2006 reauthorization added

provisions permitting judicial review of both the demand for production of information, and the
accompanying gag provision. It added a mechanism for lifting the gag provision, and made clear
that the recipient of a National Security Letter could consult a lawyer. It also required the
Inspector General of the Justice Department to conduct audits of the NSL program and report the
results to Congress. The first of those reports, issued in March 2007, found over 1000 FBI
abuses of National Security Letters during 2003-05. 30 An internal FBI audit completed in June
2007 found an additional 1000 instances of abuse. 31
Iv. Data Mining
Government has the ability to obtain access to commercial data, either through a
compulsive device like a subpoena, or by purchasing access from members of the commercial
data broker industry. 32 Once the government has access, there are differend methods of analysis,
the two most prominent being link analysis and pattern analysis. 33 Link analysis looks for
connections between different pieces of information.

An example of link analysis in an

antiterrorism investigation would be to use telephone company data to determine the phone
numbers called by a suspect, and the phone numbers of the people who have called him. Link
analysis is nothing new. It is an investigative technique that has been widely used in criminal
investigations throughout history and can include links established by other methods of

29

See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, §§115-19 (2006).
See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of
National Security Letters, March 2007, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf (last visited June 26,
2007).
31
See John Solomon, FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in Collecting Data, WASH. POST, June 14, 2007 at A1.
32
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and
Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004).
33
See Jim Harper, Testimony at U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Entitled "Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy
Implications of Government Data Mining Programs," available at http://judiciary. senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=2438&wit_id=5949 (last visited July 19, 2007).
30
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communication, including postal mail, and even links established through face to face
conversations. Computer technology, however, greatly expands the government's ability to
discover connections between people. Link analysis, of course, has some limitations. Even
though a suspected terrorist is speaking with someone by telephone, the link alone is insufficient
to indicate that something sinister is taking place. The other party to the conversation might
have nothing to do with planning an attack, like a landlord interested in collecting payment of
rent, or a restaurant receiving an order to deliver a pizza. However, the identification of the links
can cast suspicion on innocent parties.
Pattern analysis uses a different approach. Historical information is used to determine
that certain types of behavior might lead to a particular event. If there is enough repetition of the
behavior followed by the event, then detection of the behavior can be used to predict the event.
The authors of a recent report have labeled this as "predictive data mining." 34 In the commercial
context, predictive data mining can be a valuable technique. For example, data mining can be
helpful in detecting possible fraudulent use of a credit card. The history of a customer's use of a
card, combined with a bank's knowledge of the types of unauthorized charges made by thieves,
can enable the creation of a system to alert the issuing bank when a card is used in a particular
way. For example, the sudden appearance of charges of large purchases in Hong Kong, when
the card holder resides in Ohio, can be a good indication that fraud is occurring. In this sort of
commercial context, the large quantity of historical data about credit card use makes it possible
to establish fairly reliable patterns, which helps the bank to be more vigilant. And in this
example, fraud detection data mining is mutually beneficial to the customer and the business.

34

See Jeff Jonas and Jim Harper, Effective Counterterroism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining, available at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6784 (last visited July 27, 2007).
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But how useful is data mining likely to be in predicting terrorist attacks? The same
authors who coined the term "predictive data mining" conclude that pattern analysis is unlikely
to be very useful. They provide three reasons. First, the small number of terrorist attacks do not
provide enough information to establish a reliable historical pattern. Second, even if certain facts
are connected to a potential threat, a data mining system which uses those facts can still lead to a
large number of "false positive" instances in which the wrong people are identified.

For

example, when data mining expert Hank Asher created a data mining program in the days
following September 11, the public then knew many of the hijackers' common characteristics.
Because of this knowledge, Asher was able to create a data mining system that limited the search
by age, gender, pilot training and ethnicity. Even using that kind of after-the-fact information,
when his system came up with the narrowest list of people with a "high terrorist factor," it
contained 1,200 names, only five of whom were hijackers. Over 99% of the people on the list
were false positives. Third, predictive data mining could be based on "red teaming," in which
the designers of the system would try to think like a terrorist and come up with a hypothetical
plan for an attack. A data mining system could then be based on the probable activities than
would be engaged in before carrying out the attack. But a data mining system based on "red
teaming" also runs the risk of generating such a large number of false positives as to be
ineffective. For example, one could assume that terrorists will carefully observe a target by
taking photographs as part of the process of planning an attack. However, photography of
buildings, bridges and airports is also consistent with the innocent behavior of tourists, amateur
photographers and people interested in architecture and engineering. 35
Despite these limitations, after September 11 the executive branch of the federal
government has considered various forms of data mining as part of its efforts to combat
35

Id.
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terrorism. Some projects have been conducted in secret and caused quite a bit of controversy
when exposed. Others were created in the open, even though some of their methods were not
revealed. It is likely that some forms of data mining remain secret. The most controversial
project was the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program run by the Defense Department and
headed by Admiral John Poindexter who had been involved in the Iran/Contra scandal in the
1980s. 36 TIA, also known at Terrorism Information Awareness, considered the possibility of
mining a large number of government and commercial databases to look for signs of possible
terrorist activity. Because of public opposition largely fueled by privacy concerns, Congress
canceled transparent funding for the project in 2003. However, Congress allowed unspecified
components of the project to continue as part of the Defense Department's classified budget. 37
Another controversial project begun in the aftermath of September 11, the Multi-State
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, also known as MATRIX, involved a database containing
roughly 4 billion items of mostly publicly available information from government and private
sources. It was initially developed by Seisint and originally included the "high terrorist factor"
component mentioned earlier. MATRIX was operated as a pilot project which ended in April
2005. Although as many as 16 states were reported to have either participated in, or seriously
considered participating in, MATRIX, only 4 states were actively involved when the project
ended. States were reluctant to participate in MATRIX for a variety of reasons, including
privacy concerns. 38
Some data mining programs began covertly and were later exposed by the media. An
example is the National Security Agency's program of surveillance of domestic phone calls

36

See Jeffrey W. Seifert, Data Mining and Homeland Security, An Overview 5-8, available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf (last visited July 19, 2007).
37
Id. at 8.
38
Id. at 12-16.
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which was exposed in December 2005.

Controversy over the NSA project generated

Congressional hearings and several lawsuits. Some of the lawsuits are directed at the NSA and
seek to restrict or terminate the surveillance on Constitutional grounds. Others are by the federal
government seeking to block state regulators from investigating the extent to which
communications companies have provided customer information to the NSA. 39

Another

example of a covert program exposed by the media is the Treasury Department's mining of
international and domestic electronic financial data transmitted over a communications system
operated by the European-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transfers, known by
the acronym SWIFT. In Europe, officials of national data protection agencies, and the European
Union's top privacy official, have concluded that SWIFT's actions in providing personal
information to the U.S. Treasury were in violation of European data protection law. However,
no enforcement action was taken, and an agreement between European and American officials
permitting the transfers with some privacy safeguards was reached during the summer of 2007. 40
Data mining has been a significant part of programs aimed at airline and border security.
Proposed systems for computerized "prescreening" of airline passengers (before they experience
the physical screening at the airport) have included use of commercial databases, as well as
government "selectee" and "no fly" lists containing names of people who should be subjected to
secondary physical screening, or who should not be allowed to board a flight unless cleared by
law enforcement agents at the airport.

One proposal, known as CAPPSII (Computerized

Passenger Prescreening System II,) was canceled by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and replaced by another proposed system called Secure Flight. Both proposals were

39
40

Id. at 18-20.
See, e.g., James Risen, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal With Europe On Bank Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007.
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criticized because of privacy concerns. Implementation of Secure Flight was suspended by DHS
in 2006 to allow officials to address privacy and other issues. 41
After September 11, Congress passed legislation directing airlines to provide the
Department of Homeland Security with access to information in airline reservation databases,
known as passenger name record (PNR) data, for passengers arriving on international flights.
The requirement has been a source of friction between European officials and the U.S. because
European law requires a proper legal basis for all transfers of personal information from
European Union countries to destinations whose privacy laws are not compatible with European
standards. Because United States laws fail to meet those standards, European Union officials
and officials from the Department of Homeland have negotiated several agreements that permit
transfers with privacy safeguards. The agreements have been controversial in Europe. The first
agreement was nullified by Europe's highest court in 2006. A second agreement was reached in
the autumn of 2006, and was replaced by third agreement during the summer of 2007. 42 In
addition to airline passenger reservation data, another system called the Automated Targeting
System (ATS) uses data mining to assess risks associated with all people and cargo entering the
United States. 43
How can there be so much controversy over the privacy implications of these programs,
especially with respect to government access to personal data in commercial databases, when
Congress imposed duties on federal agencies to protect the privacy of individuals by passing the
Privacy Act in 1974? Doesn't it provide sufficient safeguards?
41

The simple answer is that

See generally United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International
Passenger Prescreening are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, May 2007, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07346.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
42
See Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger
Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ pdf/en/07/st11/ st11595. en07. pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2007.)
43
See United States Government Accountability Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger
Prescreening are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, May 2007, 7, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07346.pdf (last visited June 4, 2007).
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Congress did not anticipate the data mining techniques that currently allow federal agencies to
use information from private sector databases.

The Privacy Act is from a different era of

computer technology, and was written to apply only to databases created either by the federal
government, or on its behalf by private contractors. 44 Furthermore, Congress exempted data
used for law enforcement or intelligence purposes from Privacy Act protection even when it
comes from a government database. 45
V. Privacy Principles And Trust In Government
What effect do these data mining activities have on public trust in government? A good
starting point in this analysis is to look to general privacy principles with respect to the handling
of personal information. Many of those principles were developed in the 1970s in the U.S. and
Europe, and received international approval through guidelines adopted by the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development. They were the foundation for the Privacy Act in the
U.S. and comprehensive data protection legislation in Europe and elsewhere. The core principles
recognized in the U.S. and elsewhere provide that individuals should be able to determine the
existence of databases containing personal information, that an individual should be able to find
out what information about him or her is in the database, that the individual should have the right
to correct inaccurate information, that there should be no secondary use of the data without the
individual's consent, and that the database should contain accurate information and be secure. 46
Additional principles recognized in Europe are that data should be collected fairly and for
legitimate purposes, that the individual should be informed at the time of collection of the

44

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (2000).
See Jack Dempsey and Lara Flint, Privacy's Gap: The Largely Non-Existent Legal Framework for Government Mining of
Commercial Data, available at http://www.cdt.org/ security/ usapatriot/ 030528cdt.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
46
See U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973); OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), available at http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secure/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM
(last visited July 24, 2007.)
45
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purposes for which the data will be used, and that data collection should be "proportional," i.e.
not excessive. 47

Taken together, these principles probably are a good indication of public

concerns regarding the use of personal data and how violations of those principles can diminish
trust.
Recent highly publicized events concerning government mining of personal data from
commercial databases indicate how departures from these principles may be eroding public trust.
The National Security Agency's warrantless surveillance program is a good example. Although
some of the details of the program are still secret, it appears that the NSA has had access to
information about U.S. telephone calls, and has been mining that data to detect evidence of
planning of terrorist attacks. The program is contrary to the no-secondary-use-without-consent
principle that personal data collected for one purpose (telephone billing records) should not be
used for another purpose (government surveillance) without the individuals' consent. It also is
contrary to the principle that the existence of a database should not be secret.
Another example, reported in a May 2007 television program titled "Spying on the Home
Front," is the FBI's collection of information about hundreds of thousands of tourists in Las
Vegas in late December 2003 in response to intelligence that a terrorist attack might be made in
the city. Although the details of the data collection were not specified, probably because the
information was collected using National Security Letters which prohibit recipients from
disclosing the existence of the FBI demands, it appears that hotels, car rental companies and
other businesses catering to visitors turned over all their information about customers during late
December. Once again, this government activity violates the principles of no secondary use
without consent, and no secret databases.

47

See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L281), often referred to at the Data Protection Directive.
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Privacy experts are alarmed by these and other examples. Law professor and former
Clinton Administration privacy advisor Peter Swire has compared these instances of government
acquisitions of massive amounts of data to the indiscriminate British searches of American
colonists' homes under general warrants during the 1700s. Today, everyone is a suspect, in
apparent contradiction of the Fourth Amendment principle that searches should be based on
particularized suspicion. 48 Other privacy experts have expressed similar concerns during U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. These concerns have been raised across the political
spectrum, reflecting that libertarian values can cross party lines. 49
How is the average citizen reacting?

An annual privacy trust study of the U.S.

government surveyed 7,000 U.S. residents in 2007 to determine their level of trust connected
with federal agencies' use of personal information. 50 Overall, trust in all federal government
agencies declined from a rating of 52% in 2005 to 45% in 2007. The least trusted agencies in the
2007 survey, with the change from 2004 survey in parentheses, are:
National Security Agency:

19%

(-10%)

Central Intelligence Agency:

21%

(-06%)

Department of Homeland Security:

22%

(-05%)

Office of the Attorney General:

23%

(+01%)

U.S. Justice Department:

29%

(+05%)

Although the survey did not explore whether government mining of commercial data plays a role
in determining levels of public trust, there appears to be a correlation between those agencies
48

See comments by Peter Swire on the Public Broadcasting System television program Frontline titled "Spying on the Home
Front" broadcast on May 15, 2007.
49
Compare testimony of former Republican Congressman Robert Barr and statement of Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy at a
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled "Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of Government Data
Mining Programs" held on January 10, 2007, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2438 (last visited July 27,
2007).
50
See Ponemon Institute, 2007 Privacy Trust Study of the United States Government, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/pdf/2007ponemon.pdf (visited July 24, 2007). In 2007, the two most trusted federal agencies were
the U.S. Postal Service at 83% and the Federal Trade Commission at 80%.
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which have been publicly identified as engaging in data mining (the National Security Agency,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI which is part of the Justice Department) and
low scores in the trust survey.
Vi. Fear, Civil Liberties And The Future
Of course, fear has played a large part in the government's response to the attacks on
September 11. From personal experiences we all know that fear is a powerful motivator. Why?
Security expert Bruce Schneier points to the human brain. In an evolutionary sense, one of the
oldest centers of the brain, known as the amygdala, is responsible for processing emotions that
come from sensory inputs, like anger, avoidance and fear. It is the area that controls the "fight or
flight" response that instantly tells someone crossing the street to jump out of the path of an
oncoming bus. The amygdala processes information very quickly and enables humans to survive
when faced with sudden danger. A different part of the brain, the neocortex, whose evolutionary
development is comparatively recent, is intelligent and analytic. It processes information much
more slowly than the amygdala. It is the neocortex than enables humans to make a rational
assessment of danger. Our brains have separate systems for responding to danger: the high
speed, reactive, amygdala, and the much slower, rational, neocortex. 51
Has human neurology been a factor in government responses to crises? Has fear led to an
erosion of civil liberties?

Consider some examples from U.S. history.

In the 1790s the

Federalist Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts at a time when there was fear of
revolutionary France's attacks on American ships, and concern that immigrants were supporting
domestic political dissent that might destroy the U.S. government. Newspaper editors who were
critical of the Federalists and supportive of then Vice President Thomas Jefferson were

51

See Bruce Schneier, Why the Human Brain Is a Poor Judge of Risk, WIRED NEWS, March 22, 2007, available at
http://www.schneier.com/essay-162.html (last visited July 27, 2007).
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imprisoned for violating the Sedition Act, which today would almost certainly have been struck
down as violating the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech. 52 During the Civil
War, the Lincoln Administration suspended habeas corpus, allowing the imprisonment without
judicial process of people considered to be a threat to the Union. Although the suspension was
probably justified in Maryland during the first few months of the war, when southern
sympathizers had attacked federal troops on their way to defend Washington, burned railroad
bridges and cut telegraph lines, thus threatening to isolate the nation’s capital, the suspension
was probably misused in other places later in the war. 53 During World War I, Congress enacted
the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act, which were used to convict war critics for comments
that today would almost certainly be protected by the First Amendment. 54 A series of bombings
in 1919 led to mass arrests of innocent immigrants and U.S. citizens during the Palmer Raids in
early 1920, orchestrated by U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. 55 In February 1942,
during the early stage of U.S. involvement in World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt issued
an executive order directing the internment of people with Japanese ancestry living in western
states, most of whom were U.S. citizens. 56 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a period often
linked with the excesses of Senator Joseph McCarthy, Congress conducted heavy-handed
investigations of people suspected of having ties to communism. 57 During the 1960s and 1970s,

52

See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 75-83 (2005).
See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, 181-98, 236-40 (2006). Article I, Section 9, of the U.S. Constitution
provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended "unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety
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See DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE, THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 75-88 (1980)
55
See MURRAY B. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY OF REPRESSION, 31-75 (1971).
56
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law's Open Areas, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1319-24 (2006).
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See generally DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978).
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the FBI and other federal agencies secretly monitored the activities of civil rights and antiVietnam War activists. 58
These examples provide evidence that in times of crisis, when fear is high, the federal
government has reacted in ways which threaten civil liberties. 59

Presumably, the officials

responsible for these measures were not much different from those who held office in more
tranquil eras. Two of the presidents who participated in these reactions, Abraham Lincoln and
Franklin Roosevelt, are regarded by historians as being among the best presidents in the history
of the United States. Perhaps the explanation for these measures, many of which had public
support when imposed, but in hindsight were clearly excessive, is that the neurology of the
human brain can cause people to make bad decisions when motivated by fear. And this analysis
can help explain why, in the aftermath of September 11, the federal government has turned to
data mining projects that appear to threaten the privacy of ordinary people.
There have been signs, however, that government mining of commercial data could be
subjected to greater restraints in the future. Some data mining projects have been canceled or
suspended in response to privacy concerns.

There is a very active and articulate privacy

advocacy community in the U.S. which helps educates the public and puts pressure on
government officials.

Congress is becoming increasingly active in exercising oversight of

federal agencies and is requiring reports on some data mining activities. Many agencies now
have dedicated privacy officials who help shape new projects through privacy impact
assessments and generally act to restrain abusive activities. Journalists have done good work
increasing government transparency by informing the public of programs that affect personal
privacy. And finally, there is traditional American skepticism of excessive governmental power
58
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which can be a force restraining some of the more excessive forms of data mining. Many of
these rational restraints, however, can be overcome by fear. Another major terrorist attack in the
U.S. could quickly lead to even more intrusive data mining projects. Even without an attack,
Congress demonstrated in August 2007 that it remains susceptible to arguments based on fear,
when it temporarily amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit some types of
interceptions of electronic communications without prior authorization of the FISA court.60
Vii. Conclusion
Government mining of personal data in commercial databases for the purpose of
detecting terrorism after September 11 is likely to have contributed to an erosion of public trust
in government. Current law provides few restrictions on data mining, and allows broad-based
examinations of personal data in apparent contradiction of the principle that government scrutiny
of private lives should only occur when there is particularized suspicion. As in other periods of
crisis in U.S. history, fear has led to government actions that reduce civil liberties. Although
Congress has demonstrated that it is capable of acting as a restraining force, it remains
susceptible to fear-based justifications for additional surveillance. Government reliance on data
mining will probably increase in the near future. Another terrorist attack in the U.S., and the fear
it would generate, would undoubtedly accelerate that trend.
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